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Abstract—Predicting the outcomes of integrating Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS)
is a complex problem which is required to be addressed by
simulation studies before allowing the routine access of UAS into
the NAS. This paper focuses on providing a 3-dimensional (3D)
simulation framework using a game theoretical methodology to
evaluate integration concepts using scenarios where manned and
unmanned air vehicles co-exist. In the proposed method, human
pilot interactive decision making process is incorporated into
airspace models which can fill the gap in the literature where
the pilot behavior is generally assumed to be known a priori. The
proposed human pilot behavior is modeled using dynamic level-
k reasoning concept and approximate reinforcement learning.
The level-k reasoning concept is a notion in game theory and
is based on the assumption that humans have various levels
of decision making. In the conventional “static” approach, each
agent makes assumptions about his or her opponents and chooses
his or her actions accordingly. On the other hand, in the
dynamic level-k reasoning, agents can update their beliefs about
their opponents and revise their level-k rule. In this study,
Neural Fitted Q Iteration, which is an approximate reinforcement
learning method, is used to model time-extended decisions of
pilots with 3D maneuvers. An analysis of UAS integration is
conducted using an example 3D scenario in the presence of
manned aircraft and fully autonomous UAS equipped with sense
and avoid algorithms.
Index Terms—UAS integration into NAS, Modeling, Reinforce-
ment Learning, Game Theory, Neural Fitted Q Iteration.
I. INTRODUCTION
ALTHOUGH unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have oper-ational and cost advantages over manned aircraft in many
applications, they do not have routine access to the National
Airspace (NAS). The aviation industry, being very sensitive to
safety, needs strong evidence that the UAS integration will not
have any negative impact on the existing airspace system in
terms of safety [2], [3] before they are granted routine access
into the NAS. Until technologies, standards, and procedures
for a safe integration of UAS into the airspace are matured,
there will not be enough data accumulated about the issue
and it will be hard to predict the effectiveness of the related
technologies and concepts. Although research efforts exist to
develop a safe and efficient real test environment for UAS
integration [25], flight tests are expensive and experimental
failures can cause severe economic loss. Therefore, employing
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simulations is currently the most efficient way to understand
the effects of UAS integration on the air traffic system [4].
These simulation studies need to be conducted with hybrid
airspace system (HAS) models, where manned and unmanned
vehicles coexist.
HAS models in the literature are generally based on the
assumption that the pilots of manned aircraft always behave
as expected, without deviating from ideal behavior [5]-[10].
Most of the existing HAS models are designed to evaluate and
test the performance of collision avoidance systems in single
encounter scenarios in which the intruder (generally a manned
aircraft) has a pre-defined behavior with no consideration of
the decision making process of the pilot. These models are
valuable and essential at the initial stages of evaluating a
new method but it is not realistic to expect that the pilot,
as a decision maker, will always behave deterministically
and in a pre-defined manner. It is not always predictable,
for example, how pilots will respond to the traffic control
alert system (TCAS) [11]. TCAS is an on-board collision
avoidance system which observes and tracks surrounding air
traffic, detects conflicts and suggests avoidance maneuvers to
the pilots. In recent studies, it was shown that only 13% of
pilot responses match the deterministic pilot model that was
assumed for TCAS development [12], [13]. Therefore, incor-
porating human decision-making processes in HAS models
has a strong potential to improve the predictive power of these
models.
In prior works [14], [15], authors have created HAS models
with human decision making models, inspired by a game
theoretical methodology known as semi-network-form games
[12], where the pilot behavior was not assumed to be known
a priori but obtained using 1) the level-k reasoning concept
which is a game theoretical approach used to model multiple
strategic player interactions, where it is assumed that humans
have various levels of reasoning, level-0 being the lowest
level, and 2) reinforcement learning, which helps model time
extended decisions as opposed to assuming one-shot decision
making. Although these studies introduced one of the very
first examples of HAS models where several decision makers
can be modeled simultaneously in a time-extended manner,
they had two limitations: First, HAS models were developed
for a 2-dimensional (2D) airspace. Second, the policies, i.e.
maps from observation spaces to action spaces, obtained for
the decision makers remain unchanged during their interaction.
In the proposed framework, these limitations are removed and
a 3D HAS model is introduced where the strategic decision
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2makers can modify their policies during interactions between
each other. Therefore, compared to [14], [15] a much larger
class of interactions can be modeled.
It is shown in the literature that 1) in repeated strategic
interactions, where agents consider other agents’ possible
actions before determining their own, agents with different
cognitive abilities change their behavior during the interaction
[17] and 2) there is a positive relationship between cognitive
ability and reasoning levels [16], [17]. These observations
lead to agents with different levels of reasoning who can
observe their opponents’ behavior during repeated interactions,
update their beliefs on their opponents’ reasoning level and
change their own level-k rule against them. In [16] and [17],
a systematic level-k structure is introduced where players can
update their beliefs about their opponents, and switch their
own level rule up one level during their interactions. There
are also other level-k rule learning models in the literature
such as the ones presented in [18] and [19], where the agent
levels can reach up to infinity. This is not a problem for the
applications investigated in [18] and [19], in which obtaining
level-k rules (k=0,1,2,...,∞) are straight forward and has an
analytical solution. Since it is computationally expensive to
obtain higher levels, and in certain experimental studies it is
shown that humans in general have a maximum reasoning level
of 2 [32], the existing level-k rule learning methods may not
be suitable for the application considered in this work where
more than 188 decision makers are modeled simultaneously in
a time extended manner. Here, we propose a simpler method
for modeling level-k rule updates during interactions by a)
limiting the levels up to 2 and b) allowing rule updates only
if a trajectory conflict is observed.
Different from the 2D HAS model developed in [14], [15],
in this study, the game theoretical modeling framework is
developed for a 3D HAS model which allows to cover a
much larger class of integration scenarios. The reinforcement
learning algorithm used in the authors’ earlier works [33], [34],
[35] employ tables to store the Q values of all state (location
of the intruder, approach angle of the intruder, best trajectory
action, best destination action and previous action)-action (turn
left, turn right, go straight) pairs, which define how preferable
it is to take a certain action given the observations/states.
This poses a challenge for the application of the method to
systems with a large numbers of state-action pairs such as
the proposed 3D HAS model in this study. To circumvent
this issue, Neural Fitted Q Iteration (NFQ) method [22], [23]
and [24], an approximate reinforcement learning algorithm,
is utilized. Approximate reinforcement learning methods use
function approximators to represent the Q value function [20].
In other words, instead of saving Q values for each state-
action pair, Q value function is approximated by a function
approximator. In the case of NFQ, a neural network is used as
the function approximator. NFQ approach also allows using a
continuous observation space, which also contributes to obtain
a more precise definition of the agents’ observations, compared
to conventional approaches, where a discretized observation
space is required.
In the simulations, pilot models that are obtained using the
proposed game theoretical modeling framework are used in
complex scenarios, where UAS and manned aircraft co-exist,
to analyze the probable outcomes of HAS interactions. HAS
scenarios contain interacting humans (pilots) who also interact
with multiple UAS with their own sense and avoid (SAA)
systems. It is noted that automation algorithms other than SAA
systems, such as TCAS, and possible air traffic management
instructions can also be incorporated into the proposed frame-
work. During the simulations, UAS fly autonomously based on
pre-programmed flight plans but they can deviate from their
plans to resolve a possible conflict with the help of their SAA
algorithms. In these simulations, as an example to demonstrate
how the proposed framework can be utilized, the effect of
responsibility assignment for conflict resolutions on the safety
and performance of the HAS is analyzed (see [25] for the
importance of these variables and responsibility assignment
for UAS integration.).
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section II, the
HAS scenario for UAS integration into the NAS is described
in detail. In section III, the proposed pilot decision modeling
method is explained. In section IV, simulation results are
provided. Finally, conclusions are given in section V.
II. UAS INTEGRATION SCENARIO
In order to evaluate the possible outcomes of integrat-
ing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in to the National
Air Space (NAS), a Hybrid Air Space (HAS) scenario,
where manned and unmanned aircraft co-exist, is designed
and explained in this section. The scenario consists of 188
manned aircraft and 3 UAS. The size of the airspace is
600km×300km(horizontal)×45000ft(altitude). The initial
positions, velocities, headings and altitudes of the aircraft
are obtained from Flightradar24 website which provides live
air traffic data (http://www.flightradar24.com). The data is
collected from the air traffic volume on Colorado, USA
on March 11, 2015. The manned aircraft in the scenario
execute maneuvers based on the pilot model obtained using a
combination of reinforcement learning and level-k reasoning,
the details of which are explained in Section III. Multiple
UAS are randomly located in the airspace and move based
on their pre-programmed flight plan from one waypoint to
another. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the scenario with
multiple manned aircraft and three UAS moving through their
multiple waypoints. All aircraft whether manned or unmanned
are flying at different altitudes and this snapshot depicts a 2D
projection of their configuration, on the horizontal plane. The
red squares correspond to manned aircraft and the cyan squares
correspond to UAS, which are flying at different altitudes.
All aircraft, manned or unmanned, have continuous dynamics,
which are provided in the following sections. Yellow circles
show the predetermined waypoints that the UAS with the
highest altitude is required to pass. The waypoints of the other
two UAS are not shown in this snapshot. The black lines
passing through the waypoints show the predetermined path
of one of the UAS. It is noted that the UAS do not follow
this path exactly since it needs to deviate from its original
trajectory to avoid possible conflicts using an on-board Sense
and Avoid (SAA) algorithm, which is obtained from [31] and
[30].
3Fig. 1. 2D snapshot of the airspace scenario in the simulation platform.
In the scenario, it is assumed that each aircraft is able to
receive the surrounding traffic information using Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology. ADS-
B technology can provide an own-ship aircraft the identifica-
tion, position and velocity information of surrounding aircraft
that are also equipped with ADS-B.
A. UAS Conflict Detection And Avoidance Logic
UAS fly according to their pre-programmed flight plans, an
example of which is marked by yellow shown in Fig. 1. UAS
are assumed to have the dynamics of RQ-4 Global Hawk with
an operation speed of 340knots [29]. UAS are also equipped
with SAA systems which enable them to detect trajectory
conflicts and to initiate evasive maneuvers, if necessary. If
no conflict is detected, UAS continue to follow their mission
plan. Either receiving a conflict resolution command from the
SAA system or flying based on their pre-defined flight plan,
UAS always receives a velocity command during the flight.
The UAS velocity vector variation is modeled as first order
dynamics with a time constant of 1s [30] which is represented
as:
~˙v = −(~v − ~vd), (1)
where ~v and ~vd are the current and the desired/commanded
velocity vectors, respectively. The two SAA logics that are
utilized in this study are developed by Fasano et al. [31],
which is referred as SAA1, and Mujumdar et al. [30], which is
referred as SAA2. Both of the SAA logics contain two phases;
a conflict detection phase and a conflict resolution phase. The
conflict detection phase is the same for both SAA1 and SAA2.
A conflict is detected if the minimum distance between the
UAS and the intruder aircraft is calculated to be less than
a minimum required distance, R, during a predefined time
interval. The minimum distance is calculated by projecting
the trajectories of the UAS and the intruder aircraft in time.
Once the conflict is detected, SAA1 and SAA2 suggest their
own velocity adjustment commands in order to resolve the
conflict. The velocity adjustment command of the SAA1 and
SAA2 logics, ~vd1A and ~v
d2
A , are given in the equations below
~vd1A =
[
vAB cos(η − ζ)
sin(ζ)
[sin(η)
~vAB
vAB
− sin(η − ζ) ~r‖~r‖ ]
]
+ ~vB
(2)
~vd2A =
−~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖
‖ − ~vA(~r0.~vAB‖~vAB‖ )− (R− ‖~rm‖) ~rm‖~rm‖‖
(3)
where, ~vA and ~vB refer to the velocity vectors of the UAS
and the intruder. ~r and ~vAB denote the relative position and
velocity between the UAS and the intruder, respectively. ζ
is the angle between ~r and ~vAB and η is calculated as
η = sin−1 R‖~r‖ . ~r0 refers to the initial relative position vector
between the UAS and the intruder. If multiple conflicts are
detected, UAS start an evasive maneuver to resolve the conflict
that is predicted to happen earliest. The velocity adjustment
suggested by the SAA1 logic guarantees minimum deviation
from the trajectory, while in the case of the SAA2 logic, UAS
moves to resolve the conflict until it retains the minimum safe
distance with the intruder.
B. Manned Aircraft
All manned aircraft are assumed to be in their en-route
phase of travel with constant speed, v, in the range of
[150 − 550]knots. Pilots may decide to change the heading
angle for ±45◦, or change the pitch angle for ±10◦, or may
decide to keep both the heading and pitch angles unchanged.
Once the pilot gives a heading or pitch command, the aircraft
moves to the desired heading and pitch, ψd and θd, in the
constant speed mode where, the heading and pitch change is
modeled by first order dynamics with the standard rate turn:
a turn in which an aircraft changes its heading at a rate of
3◦ per second (360◦ in 2 minutes) [28]. This is modeled
approximately by a first order dynamics with a time constant
of 10s (45×(1−1/e)/3 ≈ 10). Therefore, the aircraft heading
and pitch angle dynamics can be given as
ψ˙ = − 1
10
× (ψ − ψd) (4)
θ˙ = − 1
10
× (θ − θd) (5)
and the velocity, ~v = (vx, vy, vz), is then obtained as:
vx = ‖~v‖ sinψ cos θ. (6)
vy = ‖~v‖ cosψ cos θ. (7)
vz = ‖~v‖ sin θ. (8)
III. PILOT DECISION MODEL
The proposed model for pilot decision making in this study
is formed by combining two methodologies: dynamic level-
k reasoning and neural fitted Q iteration (NFQ), which is
an approximate reinforcement learning algorithm. A level-k-
type model is trained by assigning level-(k-1)-type behavior
to all of the agents (manned aircraft) except the one that is
being trained. The trainee learns to react as best as he/she can
in this environment using NFQ. Thus, the resulting behavior
becomes a level-k type. This process starts with training a
level-1 type behavior and continues until the highest desired
level is reached. Once all of the desired levels are obtained, the
training stage ends and, in the simulation stage, the obtained
4level-k reaction models are used in the airspace scenario
explained in section II where both manned aircraft and UAS
co-exist. In the simulation, certain proportions of level-0, level-
1 and level-2 behavior type are assigned to the manned aircraft.
It is noted that each of level-1 and level-2 agents can change
their level-k behavior type based on Dynamic level-k reasoning
method after observing their intruder’s behavior.
A. Dynamic Level-k Reasoning
Level-k reasoning is a game theoretical model where the
main idea is that humans have various levels of reasoning
in their decision-making process [18]. It has been observed
that reasoning levels are related to the cognitive abilities of
humans [26]. The level hierarchy is iteratively defined such
that the level-k rule is a best response to the level-(k-1) rule.
A level-1 decision maker (DM), for example, assumes that
the other agents in the scenario are level-0 and takes actions
accordingly to provide the best response. A level-2 DM takes
actions to give the best response to other DMs that have level-1
reasoning and so on. From a modeling standpoint, the level-0
rule represents an initial point from which more sophisticated
rules can be obtained iteratively. A level-0 rule represents
a “nonstrategic” DM who does not take into account other
DMs’ possible moves when choosing his/her own actions. This
behavior can also be considered as “reflexive” since it only
reacts to the immediate observations. In this study, a level-0
pilot flies an aircraft with constant heading and pitch angles
starting from its initial position toward its destination.
In its conventional form, level-k reasoning help model the
interactions between the DMs where a level-k DM assumes
that the other DMs have level-(k-1) reasoning. Although this
approach proved to be successful in modeling short term or
one-shot interactions, it misses the point that agents, during
their interactions, may update their assumptions about the
other agents and in turn update their own behavior. To remedy
this problem, we introduce a closed loop algorithm which
allows the agents to dynamically update their reasoning levels
if a trajectory conflict is detected. This algorithm is explained
in Fig. 2, where a pseudo-code is provided.
• Check if there is a conflict 
• IF there is a conflict 
Take action using the existing level-k rule, 
observe the resulting HAS state and see whether conflict 
persists 
IF the conflict persists 
Switch level-k rule with 50% probability 
Else 
Continue with the existing level-k rule 
End IF 
Else 
Continue with the existing level-k rule 
End IF 
Fig. 2. Dynamic level-k reasoning pseudo-code.
B. Neural Fitted Q Iteration
Reinforcement learning is a mathematical learning method
based on reward and punishment [21]. The agent interacts with
an environment through its observations, actions and a scalar
reward signal received from the environment. The agent’s
aim is to select actions that maximizes the cumulative future
reward. Given a state, when an action increases (decreases)
the value of an objective function (reward), which defines
the goals of the agent, the probability of taking that action
increases (decreases). Reinforcement learning algorithms in-
volve estimating the state-action value function, or “the Q
value”, which is a measure of how valuable, in terms of
maximizing the total accumulated rewards, taking an action is,
given the agent’s state. This estimation is generally conducted
in an iterative fashion by updating these Q values after each
training step. In classical Q-learning reinforcement learning
algorithm, for discrete state and action spaces, the update rule
is given as [22], [24]:
Q(s, a)→ (1− α)Q(s, a) + α(r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a))
(9)
where, s, a, and s′ refer to the state, action, and the suc-
cessor state, respectively. α is a learning rate and γ is a
discounting factor. The discounting factor emphasizes the
relative importance of future rewards compared to current
rewards. Neural Fitted Q Iteration (NFQ) method [22], [24]
approximates the Q value function using a neural network
of type multi-layer perceptron. For a given state-action pair
the neural network takes the state and action as its input and
provides an approximate value of the corresponding Q value
for the state-action pair. The method’s aim is to minimize the
following error function [22]
(Q(s, a)− (r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a)))2. (10)
where, r(.) is the reward signal that agent receives from
the environment after the transition from state s to state
s′ by taking action a. This error function measures the
deviations between state-action Q values approximated by
the multi-layer perceptron (Q(s, a)) and the target value
(r(s, a, s′) + γmax
a
Q(s′, a))). In the NFQ method, Q value
functions are updated in batches meaning that the entire
set of input patterns ((si, ai), i = 0, 1, 2, 3...) and target
patterns (r(si, ai, s′i) + γmaxa Q(s
′
i, ai)), i = 0, 1, 2, 3...) are
collected and the update is performed at the end of a full
episode. To summarize, the NFQ method consists of two major
steps: the generation of a training set and training a multi-
layer perceptron using this set to obtain a Q-value function
approximating the optimal state-action Q-values, at the end of
each episode. The training is stopped whenever the received
average reward per episode converges.
The goal of the reinforcement learning algorithm is to
learn the optimal Q values by maximizing the agent’s return,
which is calculated via a reward/objective function. A reward
function can be considered as a happiness function, goal
function or utility function which represents, mathematically,
5the preferences of the pilot. In this paper, the pilot reward
function is defined as
reward = w1∗(−C)+w2∗(−S)+w3∗(−A)+w4∗(−P ).
(11)
In (11) “C” is the number of aircraft within the collision re-
gion. Based on the definition provided by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), the radius of collision is taken as 500ft
in the horizontal direction and 100ft in the vertical direction
[27]. “S” is the number of air vehicles within the separation
region. The radius of the separation region is 5nm in the
horizontal direction [8] and 1000ft in the vertical direction
based on the “Reduced vertical separation minima” [27]. “A”
represents whether the aircraft is getting closer to the intruder
or going away from the intruder in terms of their approach
angle and takes the values of 1, for getting closer, or 0, for
going away. “P” represents whether the aircraft gets closer to
or goes away from its trajectory vector in terms of angle and
takes the values of 0, for getting closer, or 1, for going away.
Although ADS-B provides the positions and the velocities of
other aircraft, with his/her limited cognitive capabilities a pilot
can not possibly process all this information during his/her
decision making process. In this study, in order to model
pilot limitations, including the limitations at visual acuity and
perception depth, as well as the limited viewing range of an
aircraft, it is assumed that the pilots can observe (or process)
the information from a limited portion of the nearby airspace.
This limited portion is called the “observation space”. Since
the aircraft are moving in a 3D region, the observation space
is a 3D portion of the nearby airspace. This observation space
is considered as a portion of a sphere centered at the location
of the pilot. In order to illustrate the observation space, it is
divided into horizontal and vertical parts and is schematically
depicted in Fig. 3. Viewing range of a pilot may be different
in horizontal and vertical directions, which is why the obser-
vation space in these two directions are shown as different
angular portions of a circle. Since the standard separation for
manned aviation is 3−5nm [8], the radius of observation space
is taken as a variable larger than 5nm. Whenever an intruder
aircraft moves toward the observation space (see Fig. 3, where
Agent B is the intruder), the approach geometry is defined
by two angles: φH , in the horizontal plane, and φV , in the
vertical plane. Aircraft’s angular orientation with respect to
his/her ideal trajectory is also defined by two angles: βH , in
the horizontal plane, and βV , in the vertical plane. Fig. 3
depicts a typical example, where the aircraft B is moving
toward the observation space with φH = −40◦, φV = +35◦,
βH = −110◦ and βV − 90◦. Aircraft relative orientations are
also coded as different “encounter types”. Fig. 4 depicts 8
types of encounter geometries projected in the horizontal plane
(left column) and the vertical plane (right column). These
geometries are indicated as C#i, i = 1, 2, ..., 8 in the figure.
Finally, the observation space includes the pilot’s memory of
what their actions were at the previous time step. Given an
observation, the pilots can choose between five actions: turn
45◦ left, go straight, turn 45◦ right, pitch 10◦ up, or pitch
10◦ down. It is noted that these pilot commands are filtered
through the aircraft dynamics provided in Section II-B.
The information of the observations and actions of the pilots
is fed to the neural network which is in charge of approx-
imating the Q values. The input vector fed into the neural
network is [sign(βH), sign(βV ), intruderstatus, sign(φH),
sign(φV ), encountertype, previousaction, action]T , where
sign(.) takes the values of +1, −1 or 0 depending on whether
its argument value is positive, negative or zero, respectively.
The intruderstatus is taken as 1 whenever an intruder is
detected by the pilot, and 0, otherwise. The encountertype
(see Fig. 4) is fed to the neural network in the form of
a vector with 2 elements indicating the encounter type in
horizontal plane and vertical plane. The 1st element takes
the values of −1, −0.5, 0.5 and +1 for encounter types
of C#1, C#2, C#3 and C#4 in horizontal plane, and 0,
otherwise. Similarly, the 2nd element takes the values of
−1, −0.5, 0.5 and +1 for encounter types of C#5, C#6,
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Fig. 3. Pilot observation space.
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C#7 and C#8 in vertical plane, and 0, otherwise. The
previousaction and action are fed to the neural network in
the form of a vector with 4 elements: actions “turn 45◦ left”,
“go straight”, “turn 45◦ right”, “pitch 10◦ up”, or “pitch 10◦
down” are coded as [0, 0, 0, 1], [0, 0, 1, 0], [0, 1, 0, 0], [1, 0, 0, 0]
and [−1,−1,−1,−1], respectively. It is noted that to improve
the precision, instead of using the signs of the orientation
angles their continuous values can be used.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, a quantitative analysis of multiple UAS inte-
gration in a crowded airspace is presented. Before presenting
these results, single encounter scenarios, where two manned
aircraft with different reasoning levels which are in a collision
path, are investigated.
A. Single Encounter Scenarios for manned aircraft
Fig. 5 presents the separation violation rates of manned
aircraft in 5000 random single encounters where pilots are
modeled as level-1 and level-2 decision makers. Separation
violation occurs when the horizontal and the vertical distances
between the two aircraft are less than the horizontal separation
requirement, 5nm [8] and the reduced vertical separation
requirement, 1000ft [8], respectively. In the figure, separation
violations are shown for 3 different “distance horizon” values,
which is the radius of the observation space depicted in
Fig. 3. Pilots oversee a 20s time window prior to a probable
separation violation with a 5second decision frequency for
choosing their actions. Distance horizon takes three values:
5nm (equal to horizontal separation requirement), 7.5nm and
10nm. Pilots are either level-0, level-1 or level-2 agents. There
are 4 possible types of scenarios: 1) level-1 pilot vs. level-
0 pilot, 2) level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot, 3) level-1 pilot vs.
level-1 pilot, and 4) level-2 pilot vs. level-2 pilot. According
to Fig. 5, in the 1st type and 2nd type scenarios (level-
k vs level-(k-1)), by increasing the distance horizon from
5nm to 10nm the separation violation rate decreases from
96.6% to 11.9%. It is noted that 82% (9.8/11.9 = 0.82) of
the 10nm distance horizon separation violations occur during
the scenarios where the encounters are difficult to be resolved.
This is because for these type of encounters, no matter how
pilots in the collision path maneuver to resolve the conflict
the separation violation occurs. In the 3rd and 4th type of
scenarios (level-k vs level-k) the separation violation rate
decreases by increasing the pilots’ distance horizon, however,
separation violation rate is still high (41.2%) even for the
10nm case. The reason for this high separation violation rate
is that when a level-k agent encounters another agent with
the same level, his/her assumption about the other becomes
invalid. This problem and its implications were discussed in
Section III-A, where a remedy was proposed (see Fig 2), which
was termed as “dynamic” level-k reasoning method. According
to Fig. 5, the separation violation rate, for regular encounters
(red), decreases from 11.1% to 2.6%, when dynamic level-k
reasoning is chosen as the interactive decision making model,
for the case of 10nm distance horizon.
To visually demonstrate the pilot decision making process,
two 3D single encounter scenarios are designed. The first
scenario consists of two manned aircraft flying towards each
other at different altitude levels, where the initial horizontal
and vertical distances between the aircraft are 21.3nm and
1000ft, respectively. The 2nd scenario consists of two manned
aircraft flying towards each other where one of them is flying
on a horizontal plane while the other is leveling up with a
constant vertical rate of 1968ft/min. In the second scenario,
initial horizontal and vertical distances between the aircraft are
21nm and 1000ft, respectively. In the scenarios, pilots can
oversee conflicts in a 20s time window prior to a separation
violation. Pilots’ distance horizon is considered to be 10nm.
Both of the aircraft can change the heading angle for ±45◦,
or change the pitch angle for ±10◦, or may keep both the
heading and pitch angles unchanged. In both of the scenarios,
4 cases for pilots’ level-k type behavior are considered: 1) a
7Fig. 5. Separation violation rates. “dst hor” refers to the distance horizon
of the pilots. On the columns that show the separation violation rates for a
10nm distance horizon, the cyan color shows the percentage of violations
that occur when the encounters are “difficult to resolve”, meaning that the
initial conditions of the encounters do not permit any type of pilot action to
avoid a separation violation.
starting point
destination
Level-0 agent
Level-1 agent
Fig. 6. Encounter scenario 1: level-1 pilot vs. level-0 pilot.
level-1 pilot vs. a level-0 pilot, 2) a level-2 pilot vs. a level-1
pilot, 3) a level-1 pilot vs. a level-1 pilot, and 4) a dynamic
level-1 pilot vs. a level-1 pilot.
Figures 6-9 depict the 2D horizontal projection snapshots
of the four cases, for the first scenario. Black, red and green
squares correspond to manned aircraft with level-0, level-1
and level-2 type pilots. The circles and stars stand for the
initial positions and final destinations of the aircraft. The gray
track lines right behind the aircraft represent their traveled
path from their initial positions to where they stand in the
snapshot. Two neighboring grid points are 5nm away. It is
seen from these figures that while level-1 vs level-0 and level-
2 vs level-1 encounter conflicts are properly resolved, level-
1 vs level-1 conflict resulted in a separation violation. As
explained earlier, this problem might occur in certain approach
geometries due to incorrect opponent level assumption. Figure
9 shows an encounter scenario where a dynamic level-k pilot
has an encounter with a level-1 pilot. The dynamic level-
k pilot starts with a level-1 policy and when he/she detects
a probable conflict, changes his/her policy to level-2 and
prevents a separation violation. Figure 10 and Fig. 11 depict
the horizontal and vertical distances between the two aircraft
during the simulation of four cases discussed here. It is seen
that no separation violation occurs except the level-1 vs level-1
case, for the 1st scenario.
starting point
destination
Level-1 agent
Level-2 agent
Fig. 7. Encounter scenario 1: level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Fig. 8. Encounter scenario 1: level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Level Changed
Conflict Detected
Trajectory Projections 
starting point
destination
Level-1 agent
Fig. 9. Encounter scenario 1: dynamic level-k pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Similar observations can be drawn for the simulations of
the second scenario, the results of which are presented in
Figures 12-15.
Fig. 10. Encounter scenario 1: horizontal distance.
8Fig. 11. Encounter scenario 1: vertical distance.
B. UAS flying in a crowded airspace
In this section, the scenario explained in section II is
simulated to investigate the effect of responsibility assignment
for conflict resolution, on safety and performance. Separation
responsibility assignment is an important issue in addressing
the integration of UAS into NAS [25]: it is crucial to determine
which of the agents (manned aircraft or UAS) will take the
responsibility of the conflict resolution. Since the loss of
separation is the most serious issue, the safety metric is taken
as the total number of separation violations between all aircraft
whether manned or unmanned. Performance metric, on the
other hand, is taken as the averaged manned and unmanned
aircraft trajectory deviations. In all of the simulations, level-0,
level-1 and level-2 pilot policies are randomly distributed over
the manned aircraft in such a way that 10% of the pilots fly
based on level-0 policies, 60% based on level-1 policies and
30% based on level-2 policies. This distribution is obtained
from human experimental studies discussed in [32] and may
not necessarily reflect the true distribution for the scenarios
discussed here. It is noted, however, that level distribution
can be adapted to other distributional data in the proposed
framework. Level-1 type and level-2 type pilots utilize the
dynamic level-k reasoning method.
Fig. 18, Fig. 19, Fig. 20, and Fig. 21 depict a comparison
of different resolution responsibility cases: manned aircraft
are responsible (dark blue), both manned aircraft and UAS
are responsible (blue) and UAS are responsible (cyan). Both
SAA1 and SAA2 logics are employed in the simulations. In
the case when only manned aircraft are responsible for conflict
resolution, UAS are forced to continue their path without
Fig. 12. encounter scenario 2: level-1 pilot vs. level-0 pilot.
Fig. 13. Encounter scenario 2: level-2 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Fig. 14. Encounter scenario 2: level-1 pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
Fig. 15. Encounter scenario 2: dynamic level-k pilot vs. level-1 pilot.
running their SAA system and manned aircraft act as dynamic
level-1 and level-2 decision makers. In the case when the
UAS are responsible for the conflict resolution, the manned
aircraft are forced to continue their path without changing
their heading and the UAS execute the maneuvers dictated
by their SAA algorithms. In the case when both the manned
Fig. 16. Encounter scenario 2: horizontal distance.
9Fig. 17. Encounter scenario 2: vertical distance.
aircraft and the UAS are responsible for the conflict resolution,
they both utilize their evasive maneuvers. Fig. 18 shows that
manned aircraft deviate more from their trajectories when only
the manned aircraft share resolution responsibility, compared
to the case when both the UAS and the manned aircraft are
responsible. This is true for both the SAA1 (on the left) and
the SAA2 (on the right) algorithms. On the other hand, Fig. 19
shows that the UAS deviates from its trajectory more when it
is responsible for the resolution, compared to the case when
the responsibility is shared, which holds true for both of the
SAA methods. Figure 20 shows, as expected, that for both
SAA1 and SAA2, the UAS flight times are the shortest when
only the manned aircraft become responsible for the resolution.
According to Fig. 21, for both SAA1 and SAA2 utilizations,
the minimum number of separation violations are observed
when conflict resolution responsibility is shared between the
UAS and the manned aircraft.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a combination of the level-k reasoning game
theoretical concept and an approximate reinforcement learning
method called Neural Fitted Q-learning is used to create a 3-
dimensional (3D) airspace modeling framework for predict-
ing the possible outcomes of integrating Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS).
Compared to the earlier results of the authors, the assumption
that the decision makers’ levels remain the same during
interactions and the requirement of keeping a large Q-value
table are removed. These are achieved by the introduction of
a dynamic level-k reasoning method and the employment of
Fig. 18. Average trajectory deviation of manned aircraft.
Fig. 19. Average trajectory deviation of UAS.
Fig. 20. UAS flight time.
Fig. 21. Separation violation between manned aircraft and UAS.
the Neural Fitted Q-learning algorithms, respectively. These
improvements made it possible to model a larger class of
interactions between the decision makers and this is demon-
strated by simulating various single encounter scenarios in
a 3D airspace. The proposed modeling framework can be
used to quantitatively investigate how safety and performance
of the simulated airspace system are affected by the various
integration technologies and concepts such as airspace density,
minimum separation distance and various UAS sense and
avoid algorithms and their design parameters. One of the
issues about UAS integration is responsibility assignment
during conflicts and it is shown how the 3D game theoretical
modeling framework discussed in this paper can be used to
study this problem.
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